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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered in 1982 by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The purpose of the review is to indicate cases of first impression and
cases that significantly affect earlier interpretations of North
Dakota law.
The following topics are included in the review:
Administrative Law ................................ 269
Civil Procedure ................................... 271
Constitutional Law ................................ 275
Criminal Law and Procedure ......................... 278
Education Law ................................... 294
Fam ily Law ...................................... 295
Insurance ....................................... 301
Juveniles ........................ ............... 302
Property ........................................ 303
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
In Nelson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau1 the
Workmen's Compensation Bureau (Bureau) appealed from a
district court judgment ordering the Bureau to make an award to
1. 316 N.W.2d 790 (N.D. 1982).
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Mrs. Nelson. 2 Mrs. Nelson was the widow of a truck driver who
died at work. 3 She filed a claim for death benefits with the Bureau,
alleging that unusual stress caused her husband's heart attack and
death. 4 The Bureau denied the claim, and Mrs. Nelson petitioned
for a rehearing.5
Following the submission of depositions by Mrs. Nelson, a
fellow worker, and a doctor, the Bureau issued an order affirming
dismissal of the claim. 6 The Bureau concluded that the claimant
failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for an award of death
benefits. 7 Mrs. Nelson appealed the order to the district court,
which determined that Mrs. Nelson did prove the requirements.
8
On appeal to the supreme court, the court held that the
portion of section 65-01-02(8) 9 defining "injury" was applicable.10
This provision requires that a heart attack be both causally related
to employment with reasonable medical certainty and precipitated
by unusual stress. 1 The court stated that it did not construe the
statute as requiring absolute medical certainty. 12 Reasonable
medical certainty is sufficient to establish the cause of death.13 The
testimony and other evidence in Nelson met this requirement. 14
The court next addressed the Bureau's claim that the heart
attack was not causally related to employment and that it was not
precipitated by unusual stress.' 5 The court stated that the
employment does not have to be the sole cause of the heart attack
because the employer takes the employee as he finds him.
16
Regarding the unusual stress requirement, the court adopted the
rationale of a Colorado case that held that "unusual or
extraordinary exertion ... does not require that the work causing
the attack be different in nature from the employee's usual work.
The unusual overexertion doctrine must be applied according to






7. Id. at 792-93.
8. Id. at 793.
9. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(8) (Supp. 1981). Section 65-01-02(8) provides as follows:
"If an injury is due to a heart attack or stroke, such heart attack or stroke must be causally related to
the worker's employment, with reasonable medical certainty, and must have been precipitated by
unusual stress." Id.
10. 316 N.W.2d at 793.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 794.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 794-96.




the employee's work history rather than the work patterns of his
profession in general." ' 17 The supreme court concluded that as
applied to the facts in Nelson, the plaintiff did not prove such
unusual stress. 18 The evidence was insufficient to conclude that
unusual stress in the course of employment precipitated the heart
attack.' 9 The court reversed the district court judgment and
affirmed the Bureau's decision to dismiss the claim. 20
CIVIL PROCEDURE
City of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc.
In City of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc.21 Central appealed
for the second time to the supreme court, opposing Minot's efforts
to regulate Central's adult bookstore operation. 22 Central raised
two issues: whether section 40-05-17 of the North Dakota Century
Code defines "adult bookstores" 23 and whether a contempt citation
based on a vague court order is proper. 24 The supreme court stated
that the determination of these issues would not aid in resolving the
controlling issues in the trial court case. 25 The court therefore
declared that Central requested the court to issue an advisory
opinion, 26 which is prohibited by law.
27
Minot contended that the court should dismiss the appeal
because the trial court had not decided all the issues. 28 The supreme
court agreed that all claims between Central and Minot had not
been resolved. 29 The court, therefore, dismissed Central's appea
30
for failure to comply with the requirements of rule 54(b) of the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.
31
17. 316 N.W.2d at 796 (quoting City & County of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n, 195 Colo.
431, __, 579 P.2d 80, 82 (1978)).
18. 316 N.W.2d at 796.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 797.
21. 325 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1982).
22. City ofMinot v. Central Ave. News, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 243, 243 (N.D. 1982). In Central's
earlier appeal the supreme court answered numerous constitutional law questions before it remanded
the case for further disposition. See City of Minot v. Central Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D.
1981).
23. 325 N.W.2d at 243. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-17 (Supp. 1981) (city restrictions on adult
establishments).
24. 325 N.W.2d at 243.
25. Id. at 244.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 243.
29. Id. at 244.
30. Id.
31. Id. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (demand forjudgment).
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Dahlen v. Landis
The court considered two questions in Dahlen v. Landis.32 The
first was whether ajury award of $67,800 was excessive in an action
for assault and battery. 33 The defendant argued that the award of
$20,000 compensatory and $45,000 punitive damages was not
supported by the evidence. 34 The court disagreed, stating that
verdicts are excessive only if the jury acted with undue passion or
prejudice, the award is without support in the record, or the award
appears clearly arbitrary, unjust, or shocking to the judicial
conscience. 35 The court held that the award was supportable
because the record indicated that the plaintiff suffered a brutal
beating, spent nine days in the hospital, and took medication to
reduce his anxiety.
3 6
The second question was whether a guilty plea to a related
criminal charge that was dismissed could be introduced into
evidence in a subsequent civil action. 37 The defendant pleaded
guilty to the criminal assault charge and received a deferred
imposition of sentence. 38 The sentence would expire automatically
after two years if the defendant met his probation conditions. 39
When the civil action was brought, the criminal charge had
expired. 40
The defendant argued that introduction of the criminal charge
violated North Dakota Century Code section 12-53-18,41 which
provides that a dismissal of a criminal charge releases the defendant
from all resulting penalties and disabilities. 42 The court disagreed,
stating that the legislature, in enacting the law, did not intend to
obliterate a defendant's conviction for all purposes. 43 The court
held that this was clear because North Dakota Century Code
32. 314 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1981).
33. Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 67 (N.D. 1981).
34. Id. The plaintiff also was awarded $2,800 in special damages. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 68.




41. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-18 (1974). Section 12-53-18 provides in part:
Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation.. . may at any
time be permitted in the discretion of the court to withdraw his plea of guilty. The
court may... set aside the verdict ofguilty... against such defendant, who shall then
be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of
which he has been convicted.
Id.




section 12-53-1914 expressly provides that "the prior conviction,
even though it has been dismissed, may be used in any subsequent
prosecution." 45 The court concluded that section 12-53-19 did not
constitute an exclusive exception. 46
Schwartz v. Ghaly
In Schwartz v. Ghaly47 the supreme court addressed whether the
district court abused its discretion by permitting expert witnesses to
testify on matters not disclosed in answers to interrogatories
regarding the substance of their testimony.48 Another question
confronting the court was the propriety of the district court's
refusal to instruct the jury that the admitting physician had a
nondelegable duty to follow a patient's course of treatment during
the patient's entire stay in the hospital. 49 The issues arose pursuant
to an action for medical malpractice. 50
The plaintiff contended that the administering physicians
negligently allowed surgery to continue after Schwartz suffered a
cardiac and respiratory arrest. 51 The district court concluded that
the witnesses fully complied with the provisions of rule 26(b) (4) (A)
(i) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 52 because their
testimony resulted in no surprise or prejudice to the opposing
counsel. 53
The supreme court affirmed the district court's decision,
declaring that the district court did not abuse its authority in
admitting the testimony of the expert witnesses.5 4 The supreme
court noted that it could not supervise a trial judge's discretionary
decisions with the scrutiny necessary to afford the defendant a
perfect trial. 55 The court further noted that the district court did not
44. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-19 (1974).
45. 314 N.W.2d at 72-73.
46. Id. at 73.
47. 318 N.W.2d 294 (N.D. 1982).
48. Schwartz v. Ghaly, 318 N.W.2d 294, 296 (N.D. 1982).
49. Id. at 300.
50. Id. at 295.
51. Id.
52. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (A) (i). This rule provides:
A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each
person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of
the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion.
Id.
53. 318 N.W.2d at 298. The supreme court supported its finding of no surprise by citing part of
the trial court's memorandum opinion. Id. at 298 n.4.
54. Id. at 299.
55. Id. at 300.
19831
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commit reversible error when it denied the motion either to exclude
the testimony of one expert witness or to postpone the trial. 56 The
court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing the
plaintiff's jury instruction regarding the duty of a surgeon because
an erroneous or insufficient instruction is obviated if the
instructions as a whole advise the jury about the law that governs
the essential issues of the case.
5 7
Tkach v. American Sportsman, Inc.
In Tkach v. American Sportsman, Inc.58 the court addressed
whether an appellee who fails to cross-appeal may raise the issues
that the trial court resolved adversely to him to support the
judgment. 59 The appellee brought an action against the appellant
to recover unpaid rent, and the appellant counterclaimed for
business losses. 60 After overruling the appellee's objections based
on the parol evidence rule, the trial court heard evidence of an
alleged oral agreement and awarded the appellant a counterclaim,
which reduced the judgment in favor of the appellee. 61 On appeal,
the appellee attempted to support his judgment by alleging that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of an oral agreement.
62
The supreme court recognized that inJudson PTO v. New Salem
School Board63 it indicated that an appellee who fails to cross-appeal
may not raise the issues that the trial court resolved adversely to
him to support the judgment. 64 The court, however, distinguished
theJudson PTO decision on two grounds. 65 First, inJudson PTO the
appellee had not properly raised the supportive issue in the trial
court. 66 Second, the court's discussion of the necessity of a cross-
appeal was merely dicta. 67 Therefore, the court followed instead the
rule that an appellee who has failed to cross-appeal may seek
affirmance of the judgment on the grounds rejected by the trial
court, 68 but the appellee may not seek a more favorable result on
56. Id. The court stated that plaintiffs counsel should have forseen the nature of the expert's
testimony. Id. at 299 n.5.
57. Id. at 301.
58. 316 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1982).
59. Tkach v. American Sportsman, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 785, 787 (N.D. 1982).
60. Id. at 786.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 787.
63. 262 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1978).
64. 316 N.W.2d at 787 (citingJudson PTO v. New Salem School Bd., 262 N.W.2d 502, 505
(N.D. 1978)).
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appeal than he received in the trial court. 69 Accordingly, the court
refused to reverse that part of the judgment granting appellant's
counterclaim, even though the supreme court concluded that the




In Anderson v. H.M., 7 a case of first impression, the supreme
court affirmed the decision of the district court, juvenile division.
72
The parents appealed the order of the juvenile division that
confirmed the juvenile referee's finding that their child was a
deprived child and the recommendation that legal custody of the
child be placed in the county social service director. 73 A temporary
custody order pursuant to section 27-20-06(1)(h) of the North
Dakota Century Code74 was issued January 26, 1981, by the
juvenile supervisor removing the child from the parents' custody. 75
A petition was then filed, alleging that the child was a deprived
child. 76 These actions were based on several incidents of alleged
child abuse and violence in the home. 77 A hearing was set on the
deprivation petition for February 25, 1981, a guardian ad litem was
appointed, and the parents were summoned for the hearing and
notified of their right to counsel. 
78
The parents claimed that section 27-20-17(2) of the North
Dakota Century Code79 requires an informal hearing within
69. Id. (referring to Baukol-Noonan, Inc. v. Bargmann, 283 N.W.2d 158, 166 (N.D. 1979)
(appellee who fails to crcss-appeal may not raise the issues that the trial court resolved adversely to
him to support thejudgment)).
70. 316 N.W.2d at 788.
71. 317 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1982).
72. Anderson v. H.M., 317 N.W.2d 394, 395 (N.D. 1982).
73. Id.
74. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-06(1)(h) (Supp. 1981). Section 27-20-06(1)(h) provides:
1. For the purpose of carrying out the objectives and purposes of this chapter and
subject to the limitations of this chapter or imposed by the court, a juvenile
supervisor shall:
h. Make such temporary order not to exceed thirty days for the custody and
control of a deprived child as he may deem appropriate.
Id.
75. 317 N.W.2d at 396.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 395-96.
78. Id. at 396.
79. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-17(2) (1974). Section 27-20-17(2) provides:
If he [the child] is not so released, a petition under section 27-20-21 shall be promptly
made and presented to the court. An informal detention hearing shall be held
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:269
ninety-six hours of detention and that section 27-20-22(1) of the
North Dakota Century Code80 requires a hearing on the petition
within ten days of filing. 81 In the alternative, the parents argued
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution 82 requires such notice and hearing.
83
The supreme court held that, under the statutory scheme of chapter
27-20 of the North Dakota Century Code, 84 when a juvenile
supervisor issues a temporary custody order under section 27-20-
06(1)(h), 85 the hearing and notice requirements of sections 27-20-
17(2)86 and 27-20-22(1)87 are not required.
88
The court, however, held that the due process clause 89
requires, at a minimum, an informal hearing on the temporary
custody order once the child has been removed from the home
because a thirty-day removal from parental custody without a
hearing is unreasonable interference with fundamental parental
promptly and not later than ninety-six hours after he is placed in detention to
determine whether his detention or shelter care is required under section 27-20-14.
Reasonable notice thereof, either oral or written, stating the time, place, and purpose
of the detention hearing shall be given to the child and if they can be found, to his
parents, guardian, or other custodian. Prior to the commencement of the hearing, the
court shall inform the parties of their right to counsel and to appointed counsel if they
are needy persons, and of the child's right to remain silent with respect to any
allegations of delinquency or unruly conduct.
Id.
80. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-22(1) (Supp. 1981). This section provides in part:
After the petition has been filed, the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which
shall not be later than thirty days after the filing of the petition. If the child is in
detention, the time for the hearing shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the
petition. The court may extend the time for hearing for good cause shown. The court
shall direct the issuance of a summons to the parents, guardian, or other custodian, a
guardian ad litem, and any other persons as appear to the court to be proper or
necessary parties to the proceeding, requiring them to appear before the court at the
time fixed to answer the allegations of the petition.
Id.
81. 317 N.W.2d at 397.
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law").
83. 317 N.W.2d at 397.
84. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1981) (Uniform Juvenile Court Act as
enacted and amended by the North Dakota Legislature). The Anderson court referred to a Georgia
decision in which the Georgia Supreme Court discussed its version of the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act. 317 N.W.2d at 398 (discussing Sanchez v. Walker County Dept. of Family & Children Servs.,
237 Ga. 406, 229 S.E.2d 66 (1976)). The Georgia Supreme Court decided, under facts similar to
Anderson, that Georgia's provisions for detention and deprivation hearings applied. 317 N.W.2d at
399. Georgia, however, had not enacted a provision comparable to North Dakota Century Code
5 27-20-06(1)(h), which gives a juvenile supervisor authority to issue temporary custody orders. Id.
at 398. Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court distinguished Anderson and decided that this
statute, as a later amendment by addition, superceded and excluded the statutory hearing
requirements of North Dakota Century Code § 27-20-17(2) and § 27-20-22(1). Id.
85. For the text of North Dakota Century Code 5 27-20-06(1)(h), see supra note 74.
86. For the text of North Dakota Century Code § 27-20-17(2), see supra note 79.
87. For the text of North Dakota Century Code 5 27-20-22(1), see supra note 80.
88. 317 N.W.2d at 399-400. The court limited its holding to the situation stated in the statute
- a hearing is not required by the statutory scheme only when the basis of the temporary custody
order is that the child is a deprived child. Id.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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rights. 90 The court stated that due process requires that an informal
hearing must be held promptly, but not later than ninety-six hours
after temporary custody begins; the child must be released unless it
is shown that reasonable grounds exist to believe that custody is
required to protect the child; reasonable notice must be given the
child and the parents, guardian, or other custodian stating the
time, place, and purpose of the hearing; notice must be given of the
right to counsel with counsel being appointed if the parties qualify;
and if, after the hearing, custody is retained, a petition alleging
deprivation must be filed and a hearing must be held prior to
expiration of the temporary custody order. 91
Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck
In Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck92 the supreme court
upheld a district court ruling that the fifth amendment privilege
does not apply to possible foreign prosecution.9 3 Defendants in an
insurance fraud action sought a protective order for the use of a
grand jury transcript based on the fifth amendment privilege.
94
Defendants asserted that the district court erred in denying them
the right to plead the fifth amendment regarding their possible
prosecution for arson in Canada.
9 5
In determining whether the fifth amendment applies to foreign
prosecution, the supreme court looked to In re Parker.96 The Parker
court noted that "[t]he fifth amendment was intended to protect
against self-incrimination for crimes committed against the United
States and the several states but need not and should not be
interpreted as applying to acts made criminal by the laws of a
foreign nation.' 97 The supreme court also considered the history of
the fifth amendment to determine its meaning.98 Noting the
absence in the fifth amendment provision of any reference to
foreign law, the court determined that the fifth amendment "was
90. 317 N.W.2d at 400-01.
91. Id. at 401-02. The court reasoned that the requirements of due process parallel the re-
quirements of North Dakota Century Code § 27-20-17(2) and 5 27-20-22(1) except that the time
period for a hearing on the deprivation petition is not dependent upon whether the child is in
detention as it is under the statute. Id. at 401.
92. 317 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1982).
93. Phoenix Assurance Co. ofCanada v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402, 411 (N.D. 1982).
94. Id. at 406. The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. CONrST. amend. V.
95. 317 N.W.2d at 408. The court stated that arson is a crime under Canadian law and is an
extraditable offense under the extradition treaty between the United States and Canada. Id.
96. Id. at 409 (referring to In Re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot sub nom.
Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970) (question of the relationship between the fifth
amendment and foreign prosecution was moot in this case)).
97. 317 N.W.2d at 407, 409 (quoting In Re Parker, 411 F.2d at 1070).
98. 317 N.W.2d at 411.
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designed to apply only to the laws of the United States and was not
intended to embrace foreign prosecution." 99
State v. Rippley
In State v. Rippley 00 the defendant appealed his conviction for
delivery of a controlled substance, alleging that absence of a
culpability requirement in North Dakota Century Code section 19-
03.1-23(1)01 resulted in an unconstitutional application of the
statute. 10 2 The defendant argued that the section could subject
innocent persons to convictions for delivery of controlled
substances in North Dakota. 10 3 Holding that the statute was
constitutional, the supreme court relied on State v. McDowell. 10 4 The
McDowell decision upheld strict liability for issuing a check without
an account or with insufficient funds. 05 The Rippley court
determined that the legislature intended the controlled substances
provision to contain no culpability requirement because there was
no express language in the statute and because in 1975 the
legislature removed from the statute the terms "knowingly or
intentionally.' '106 The court therefore concluded that the section
defines a strict liability offense. 107
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
State v. Allery
In State v. Allery' 08 the supreme court ruled that obvious error
occurred at trial because the State used as substantive evidence a
prior inconsistent statement not given under oath, because the trial
court did not instruct the jury to limit its consideration of the prior
inconsistent statement to impeachment purposes only, and because
99. Id.
100. 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1982).
101. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 19-03.1-23(1) (1981). The statute provides: "Except as authorized
by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." Id.
102. State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129, 130 (N.D. 1982).
103. Id. Rippley argued that the statute would apply to a postman delivering a controlled
substance. Id.
104. Id. at 133. See State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301 (N.D. 1981).
105. State v. McDowell, 312 N.W.2d 301, 306 (N.D. 1981) (legislature may lawfully enact a
law that does not have a culpability requirement and that still provides criminal penalties).
106. 319 N.W.2d at 133. The court reasoned as follows: "Whether or not § 19-03.1-23(1) is a
strict liability offense is a question of legislative intent to be determined by the language of the Act in
connection with its manifest purpose and design." Id. (citing State v. Nagel, 279 N.W.2d 911, 915
(S.D. 1979) (strict liability offense determined by examining legislative intent and the language and
purpose of a statute)).
107. 319 N.W.2d at 133.
108. 322 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1982).
278 [VOL. 59:269
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the trial court admitted into evidence statements approaching
improper conduct on the defendant's right to remain silent.10 9
Allery was convicted of theft of property, namely cattle, worth
more than three hundred dollars. 110  The State's evidence
implicating Allery in the theft was mostly circumstantial."' The
son of Allery's wife, Barry DeCoteau, testified at trial that he was
present in a car with Allery when Allery drove into a pasture;
however, he also testified that they did not stop. 
112
Allery appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial
court erred in admitting the testimony of two law enforcement
officers. 113 Law enforcement officers testified, without objection,
that DeCoteau made a prior statement that Allery shot a cow and
loaded it into the trunk of the car. 114 An officer also testified, again
without objection, concerning the questioning of Allery prior to
trial. 115 The officer testified about Allery's evasive answers to
questions concerning the cattle and that Allery "just grinned and
did not reply" when asked if he wanted to say anything about the
alleged thefts. 16
The court first addressed Allery's contention that the use of the
law enforcement officer's testimony about statements made by
Allery during questioning was prejudicial error because the
testimony was an improper comment upon his right to remain
silent.1 7 The court emphasized that Allery was given a Miranda
warning prior to questioning and that the law enforcement officer's
testimony was not objected to at trial." 8 The court then determined
109. State v. Allery, 322 N.W.2d 228, 232-33 (N.D. 1982).
110. Id. at 229. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 (1976).
111. 322 N.W.2d at 229. The remains of freshly butchered calves were found in a pasture near
Allery's father's home. Id. Allery's wife's automobile, to which Allery had access, was also found in
the pasture, along with a butcher knife, several other knives, and a hacksaw. Id. One person testified
at trial that Allery offered to sell meat contained in a plastic garbage bag that emitted an odor which
suggested that the meat was spoiled. Id. at 230. The State presented evidence that cattle hair was
present on the handle of a knife found in the pasture, that cattle blood was found on paper towels at
the scene, and that hair from cattle hides and blood stains were observed in the trunk of the
automobile. Id.
112. Id. at 229.
113. Id. at 230-31.
114. Id. at 229.
115. Id. at 230. The officer testified that Allerv received his Miranda warnings. Id.
116. Id. When confronted bv the officer regardint the cattle thefts and the officer's "good in-
formation- concerning them, Allerv allegedly responded. -'Well. you'll have to prove it." Id.
When questioned about how he loaded the calf. Allery allegedly laughled and stated, "Well, maybe
I'm the incredible hulk." Id.
117. Id. at 230-31. The court noted that it addressed a similar contention in State v. Schneider. Id.
at 231. See State v. Schneider, 270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978). In Schneider a police officer asked the
defendant whether he was operating the motor vehicle, and the defendant responded by stating, "I
will remain silent." Id. at 791. The officer testified at trial to the conversation and to the fact that he
twice advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. Id. After considering the entire record of the case,
including the fact that the defendant ultimately testified at trial that he had in fact been operating the
motor vehicle, the court found that the officer's testimony was harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 793.
118. 322 N.W.2d at 231.
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that although the law enforcement officer's testimony about
Allery's evasive answers could not be construed itself as an
improper comment upon Allery's right to remain silent, the
additional testimony that Allery "grinned and did not reply" did
approach an improper comment. 119 The court found, however,
that the statements did not constitute grounds for reversal. 12
0
The court next considered the possible use as substantive evi-
dence of the law enforcement officers' testimony about DeCoteau's
prior inconsistent statements. 12' The court stated that a prior
inconsistent statement may be used as substantive evidence in a
criminal case only if the prior inconsistent statement was made
under oath. 122 Because the record revealed no indication that
DeCoteau's prior statements were given under oath, the court
concluded that the testimony concerning DeCoteau's prior
inconsistent statements should not have been used as substantive
evidence. 123 The testimony could only have been considered for
impeachment purposes pursuant to rule 613 of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence. 24 The supreme court found error in the trial
court's failure to give and counsel's failure to request an instruction
limiting the use of the testimony concerning the prior inconsistent
statements.1
25
In determining whether the failure to object to the testimony
or give appropriate instructions was harmless error or obvious error
pursuant to rule 52 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 126 the court noted that "[t]he totality of circumstances
may and should be taken into consideration in resolving procedural
issues and admission of evidence."' 27 The court also noted that
even though a single item may not be sufficient to warrant a change
in the disposition of a case, "the accumulation of several doubtful
items in one case may be grounds for reaching a different
conclusion.' '1 28 Thus, the court concluded that because no
instruction was given to limit the testimony of DeCoteau to
impeachment purposes and because the remaining evidence was
circumstantial, and in one respect may have approached improper




122. Id. at 232. See N.D.R. EVID. 801(d) (1) (i).
123. 322 N.W.2d at 232.
124. Id. See N.D.R. EVID. 613 (prior statements ofwitnesses).
125. 322 N.W.2d at 232.
126. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 52 (harmless error and obvious error).
127. 322 N.W.2d at 232.
128. Id. at 233.
280 [VOL. 59:269
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DeCoteau's prior inconsistent statements was so fundamental that




In State v. Borden130 the supreme'court determined that the
presence of unknown quantities of marijuana and "hard" drugs in
a motel room provides probable cause to believe that the drugs
could be easily disposed of to support the issuance of a "no-knock"
search warrant under section 19-03.1-32(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code.1 31 Borden involved the surveillance of a motel room
rented by the defendants. 132 Officers noticed considerable traffic in
and out of the room during a two-day period, including persons
believed to be involved in local drug activity.1 33 A motel security
guard overheard persons occupying the room mention that they
had " 'two pounds to get rid of.' 134 Officers also examined the
contents of two wastebaskets in the hallway outside the room and
discovered marijuana roaches, hypodermic syringe caps, bloody
facial tissues, money due slips, marijuana seeds, and a hospital
receipt issued to one of the defendants. 1 35 With this information the
officers obtained a "no-knock" warrant for the room and then
unlocked the door and entered the room without giving notice. 136
The supreme court reversed the district court decision, which
granted the defendants' suppression motion. 137 The court reasoned
that because the evidence indicated that the defendants were
129. Id.
130. 316 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1982).
131. State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93, 97 (N.D. 1982). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3)
(1981). The section provides in part:
Any officer authorized to execute a search warrant, without notice of his authority
and purpose, may break open an outer or inner door or window of a building, or any
part of the building, or anything therein, if the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant
has probable cause to believe that if such notice were to be given the property sought in
the case may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of ... and has included in
the warrant a direction that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such
notice.
Id.
132. 316 N.W.2d at 94.
133. Id. at 96.
134. Id. at 94. Officers also overheard discussions taking place in the defendants' room with
reference to money matters and " '25 pounds.' " Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 95.
137. Id. at 96. The district court concluded that the magistrate did not have probable cause to
believe that the property might be quickly or easily disposed of if notice were given. The district court
reasoned that all the evidence suggested that the defendants had a large quantity of drugs, which
would preclude quick disposal. In addition, the officers did not testify about the ease with which the
evidence could have been destroyed. Id.
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conducting drug sales in the room and were overheard mentioning
that they had " 'two pounds to get rid of,' " the logical conclusion
was that they had a diminishing quantity of drugs in the room.13
8
In addition, the officers' discovery of bloody syringe caps in the
wastebaskets indicated the presence of "hard" drugs capable of
easy disposal. 
1 3 9
The court stated that the magistrate had reason to believe that
unknown quantities of marijuana and "hard" drugs were present
in the room and that the magistrate could "take judicial notice of
the fact that drugs are easily disposed of." 140 The court concluded




In State v. Cox1 42 defendant Cox appealed a bench trial
conviction of theft of property. 143 Cox alleged two points of error:
that the trial court judge erred in limiting defense counsel's cross-
examination 144 and that there was insufficient evidence for the trial
court to find Cox guilty of theft of property under section 12.1-23-
02 of the North Dakota Century Code.
1 45
With respect to the cross-examination issue, the supreme court
applied the rule of State v. Rindy, 146 which held that the scope of
cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the court and
will "not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 1147
The Cox court found that the trial court's limitation of cross-
examination based upon relevancy of evidence was "clearly [a]
138. Id. at 97.
139. Id.
140. Id. In State v. Loucks the court previously held that because a magistrate may take judicial
notice of the fact that drugs may be easily disposed of, it is not essential for the officer requesting a
"no-knock" search warrant to specifically state in his affidavit or testimony that it is probable that
the giving of notice will result in the destruction or disposal of drugs. Id. (referring to State v. Loucks,
209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973)).
141. 316 N.W.2d at 97.
142. 325 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. 1982). Cox was convicted of theft of property in violation of
5 12.1-23-02 of the North Dakota Century Code. State v. Cox, 325 N.W.2d 181, 182 (N.D. 1982).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 (Supp. 1981). The violation occurred as a result of a transaction
involving a trade of two vehicles. Cox argued that he only loaned a vehicle to Joe Wetch. Wetch
claimed the two traded vehicles as evidenced by an exchange of titles. 325 N.W.2d at 182.
Cox delivered a vehicle to Wetch, who sold it to Mitchussen. Mitchussen reported the vehicle
stolen on December 1, 1981. The vehicle later was recovered from Cox who admitted taking it. Id.
143. 325 N.W.2d at 182.
144. Id. Counsel for defendant Cox, during cross-examination of Wetch, inquired whether
Wetch had complied with statutory requirements for transfer of motor vehicle titles. The State
objected, and the court sustained an objection on the ground of irrelevancy. Id.
145. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02 (Supp. 1981) (State must prove that the defendant
knowingly took or exercised "unauthorized control over... the property of another with intent to
deprive the owner thereof").
146. 299 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1980).
147. 325 N.W.2d at 182 (citing State v. Rindy, 299 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1980)).
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valid exercise of its discretionary power." ' 148 The court held,
therefore, that the trial court committed no error by limiting the
scope of cross-examination. 149 The court further noted that the
defendant was only limited in questioning and was not completely
foreclosed from questioning the credibility of the witness. 
150
The supreme court also considered the defendant's second
allegation of error at trial, 151 whether there was sufficient evidence
for finding that he committed theft of property. 152 Cox argued that
there was insufficient evidence to find that he "took or exercised
unauthorized control over the property of another." 153 He believed
that because title to the automobile was in his name the property
could not belong to another. 154
Citing section 12.1-23-10 of the North Dakota Century Code,
the supreme court noted that " 'property of another' " within the
meaning of the statute may include property in which the actor
himself has an interest.155 Therefore, the court held that "the fact
that one person has title to property does not preclude the property
from being property of another person." 156 The court thus affirmed
the conviction. 157
State v. Dilger
In State v. Dilger158 the State appealed, pursuant to North
Dakota Century Code section 29-28-07(5),159 from a district court's
order suppressing three photographs in a pending murder trial.
160
148. 325 N.W.2d at 182.
149. Id. at 183.
150. Id. at 182-83. The record showed that defense counsel was permitted to show that Wetch
was not a licensed auto dealer and that counsel was able to inquire whether Wetch intended to
transfer title for the vehicle to Mitchussen within 15 days. Id.
151. Id. at 183.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Cox had delivered the title to Wetch, but had not "signed over" the title. Id. at 182 n. 1.
155. Id. at 183. The trial court concluded that Wetch owned the vehicle taken by Cox. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 184. The court noted that it looks only to "evidence most favorable to the verdict and
the reasonable inferences therefrom" when deciding whether "substantial evidence to support the
conviction" exists. Id. (citing State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980)).
158. 322 N.W.2d 461 (N.D. 1982).
159. See N.D. CENT. CooE § 29-28-07(5) (Supp. 1981). Section 29-28-07 provides in part:
An appeal may be taken by the state from:
5. An order ... suppressing evidence . . . when accompanied by a statement of the
prosecuting attorney asserting that the deprivation of the use of the property ordered
to be . . . suppressed ... has rendered the proof available to the state with respect to
the criminal charge filed with the court, (1) insufficient as a matter of law, or (2) so
weak in its entirety that any possibility of prosecuting such charge to a conviction has
been effectively destroyed.
160. State v. Dilger, 322 N.W.2d 461, 462 (N.D. 1982).
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Appellee Dilger questioned the State's authority to appeal and
raised the issue of the extent to which the prosecuting attorney must
support his statement that the suppression order has effectively
destroyed the State's case. 
161
In dismissing the State's appeal, the supreme court noted that
section 29-28-07(5) requires " 'a statement of the prosecuting
attorney asserting that the deprivation of the use of the [suppressed
evidence] . . . has rendered the proof available to the state with
respect to the criminal charges filed with the court' " inadequate.1
62
The court noted that the available proof must be " '(1) insufficient as
a matter of law, or (2) so weak in its entirety that any possibility of
prosecuting such charge to conviction has been effectively destroyed.' "163 The
court held that an appeal taken by the prosecuting attorney
pursuant to section 29-28-07(5) must be more than a mere
recitation of the statutory language.164 Such an appeal should in
addition "provide this court with an explanation, not inconsistent
with the record, stating the reasons why the trial court's order has
effectively destroyed any possibility of prosecuting the criminal
charge to a conviction.' '165 The prosecution's explanation may, but
need not be based upon the record and should be included either
with the statement required by section 29-28-07(5) or in the
prosecution's brief filed for purposes of the appeal. 1
66
The court, in reviewing the prosecutor's statement, will give
the "utmost deference" to the prosecutor's judgment in evaluating
the remaining proof. 67 Moreover, the court stated that it would be
reluctant to dismiss the State's appeal "unless the prosecution's
determination of the need for the suppressed evidence is clearly
inconsistent with the record or is without foundation in reason or
logic. ''168
State v. Heger
At issue in State v. Heger 69 was the defendant's mental
competence to stand trial. 170 The district court, after hearing expert
medical testimony from both sides and conducting its own informal
161. Id. at 462-63.
162. Id. at 462 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5)).
163. 322 N.W.2d at 462 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(5)) (emphasis in original).





169. 326 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 1982).
170. State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 856 (N.D. 1982).
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examination of the defendant, found that the defendant was
competent to stand trial.'71 The defendant was tried and convicted
of murder, gross sexual imposition, and burglary. 7 2 The sole issue
on appeal was whether the district court erred in finding the
defendant competent to stand trial. 1
73
In affirming the district court's finding of competence, 174 the
supreme court established that the prosecution has the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence on the issue of
competence. 175 The court also stated that its review of a trial court's




In State v. Knoefler177 the supreme court held that defense
counsel's inability to acquire an expert witness because of a conflict
in dates did not constitute "good cause shown" to warrant
continuance of the trial. 178 The action arose because the defendant
operated beehives without a license 79 and violated the state's two-
mile spacing requirement for beehives. 180 Following his arrest, the
defendant retained two attorneys, one from California and one
from North Dakota. 181 Because of a misunderstanding, neither
attorney contacted an expert witness until it was too late to obtain a
witness for trial. 182 The trial court refused to grant a continuance
after defendant's counsel submitted an affidavit to the court
verifying what the expert's testimony would have been. 1 3 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the defendant had at least
one counsel who was effective and affirmed the denial of a
continuance. 184
The court affirmed its ruling in a related case when it
171. Id. at 857.
172. Id. at 856.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 861.
175. Id. at 858.
176. Id.
177. 325 N.W.2d 192 (N.D. 1982).
178. State v. Knoefler. 325 N.W.2d 192, 194 (N.D. 1982).
179. Id. at 194. See N.D. CENT. CODE 4-12-03 (Supp. 1981) (establishes licensing requirements
necessary for valid operation of beehives within the State of North Dakota).
180. 325 N.W.2d at 194. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-12-03.1 (Supp. 1981). This section provides:
"No new commercial location may be established within two miles [3.22 kilometers] of another
commercial location. No commercial operator may establish an apiary within two miles [3.22
kilometers] of another commercial operator. The noncommercial beekeeper with one to twenty-four
colonies will have territorial rights on one location." Id.
181. 325 N.W.2d at 194.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 196.
184. Id. at 199-200.
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concluded that the two-mile spacing requirement was rationally
related to the prevention of honey raiding and the spread of bee
diseases. 185 The court stated that the defendant could not benefit
from the argument that the statute should be more restrictive to
accomplish its stated purpose. 18 6 Finally, the court concluded that
the defendant could not benefit from a claim of discriminatory
prosecution when the defendant intentionally confronted the law to
challenge the constitutional validity of the statute. 187
State v. Manke
In State v. Manke188 the supreme court considered whether the
State in a criminal prosecution could use the public records
exception 89 to the hearsay rule1 90 to gain admission into evidence
of a laboratory report when the chemist making the report was
available for cross-examination. 191 The State sought to introduce
the laboratory report after it was unable to call the chemist due to
the State's failure, within the prescribed time limits, to endorse the
chemist as a witness. 192 The trial court admitted the "rape kit"
report into evidence, 193 and the defendant was convicted. 194 On
appeal, the defendant argued that the report was inadmissible
hearsay. 
195
The supreme court ruled that the report was admissible under
the spirit of rule 803(8) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 19
6
The language of the rule, however, explicitly limits its applicability
to public records or reports when used in civil actions or against the
State in criminal proceedings. 197 The court nevertheless stated that
admitting the laboratory report was consistent with the assumption
that reports of public officials possess adequate indicia of
trustworthiness and reliability if certain factors are present such as
timeliness of investigation, special skills, and no improper
motive. 198
185. Id. at 195 (affirming State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1979)). The court stated
that it is for the legislature and not the courts to determine proper spacing regulations. 325 N.W.2d
at 196.
186. 325 N.W.2d at 196.
187. Id. at 198.
188. 328 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1982).
189. See N.D.R. EVID. 803(8) (hearsay exception for public records and reports).
190. See N.D.R. EvID. 801(c) (hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted").





196. Id. at 804-05.
197. Id. at 803. See N.D.R. EvID. 803(8).
198. 328 N.W.2d at 803.
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The court stated that the reason for limiting the application of
rule 803(8) is that allowing into evidence evaluative reports of
public officials against an accused in a criminal case would violate
his right to confront witnesses against him. 199 Because the chemist
was available to testify, the admission of the report did not violate
the defendant's right to confront the witness against him. 200
State v. Marinucci
In State v. Marinucci °1 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction pertaining to
acts that may not be enjoined or restrained during a labor
dispute; 20 2 that a statute authorizing payment of reasonable costs of
prosecution as a sentencing alternative is constitutional; 20 3 and
that the evidence sustained the conviction of defendant Marinucci
for criminal coercion. 20 4 The appeal stemmed from an incident
occurring during a strike of the Steiger Tractor Corporation plant
in Fargo, North Dakota. 20 5
The defendant was convicted of criminal coercion for
threatening to damage the vehicle of an over-the-road truck driver
who crossed the Steiger picket line. 20 6 Defendant argued that he
was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to give a
requested instruction, which provided that his conduct as an
employee on strike was not illegal and could not be judicially
restrained. 20 7 The supreme court noted that a trial court may refuse
to submit an inapplicable or irrelevant instruction to the jury.20 8
The supreme court found that the jury was instructed on the
elements of the crime and that the defendant had a right to exercise
his freedom of speech by discussing the facts of the labor dispute,
absent a violation of the law. 20 9 The court held that the trial court's
instruction correctly and adequately dealt with the defendant's
rights. 2
10
The supreme court found that the testimony of a trucker and a
199. Id. at 803-04. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
200. 328 N.W.2d at 804.
201. 321 N.W.2d 462 (N.D. 1982).
202. State v. Marinucci, 321 N.W.2d 462, 466 (N.D. 1982).
203. Id. at 467.
204. Id. at 468.
205. Id. at 463.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 464. The requested instruction would have stated that the defendant could not be
restrained from giving publicity to the strike. Id. at 465.
208. Id. (citing State v. Granrud, 301 N.W.2d 398 (N.D.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981)).
209. 321 N.W.2d at 465-66.
210. Id. at 466.
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dispatcher with whom the defendant spoke was sufficient to support
an inference that the statements made by the defendant resulted in
a threat. 211 The court noted that circumstantial evidence may
justify a conviction provided it is of sufficient probative force to
enable a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 2 The court
stated that it will review the evidence to determine whether the
evidence is competent to warrant a conviction. 213 The court held
that the testimony of the truck driver and his employer was
sufficient to meet the competence test and, therefore, to allow the
jury to infer that the defendant's statements constituted a threat. 
214
The defendant argued that the statute215 allowing costs as an
alternative to sentencing had a chilling effect on his right to a
trial.216 The court held that the defendant failed to advance a




In State v. McCabe218 defendant McCabe, along with two
others, used a stolen credit card to purchase goods at a Bismarck
Holiday Inn.219 A cashier at the Holiday Inn became suspicious of
the defendant and closely observed him. 220 After his purchase, the
cashier called Mastercharge and learned that the credit card was
stolen. 221 The cashier immediately contacted the Bismarck Police
and she, along with one other clerk, gave the police a fairly
complete description of the defendant. 222 An individual at the
Holiday Inn informed police officers where they could find the
defendant. 223 The police went to the address, found a man closely
fitting the description given by the cashier, and made a warrantless
arrest of McCabe. 224 The police took McCabe to the police station
211. Id. The defendant stated the following to the transportation dispatcher: " 'Got a bunch of
angry guys out here and I don't know if I can handle them all. Something could happen to your
truck, trailer, don't forget we're an international union.' " Id. at 464. The trucker testified that the




215. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02(1)(a) (1976) (State must prove that the defendant
intentionally compelled another person to commit a crime).
216. 321 N.W.2d at 466. The trial court required the defendant to pay $600 in court costs. Id.
217. Id. The court stated that a statute is presumptively constitutional unless it is clearly shown
to contravene the state or federal constitution. Id. (citing Dorgan v. Kouba, 274 N.W.2d 167 (N.D.
1978)).
218. 315 N.W.2d 672 (N.D. 1982).







and photographed him. 225 The police then showed this photograph
along with five others of similar description to the cashier. She
immediately identified McCabe's photograph.
226
McCabe was subsequently charged with forgery, a class A
misdemeanor. 227 McCabe sought to suppress any evidence of
photographic identification and any evidence of in court
identification. 228 McCabe argued that the arrest was invalid
because it was a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor not
committed in the presence of the officer. 229 The trial court granted
the motion. 230 The State appealed two issues: .whether the arrest
was invalid and whether the court erred in prohibiting in court
identification of McCabe. 2
31
Section 29-06-15(4)232 of the North Dakota Century Code
discusses warrantless arrests. In State v. Willns 23 3 the supreme court
interpreted the statute, finding that a "charge," within the
meaning of the statute, could be an oral charge made to a police
officer. 234 In McCabe there was an oral charge made to the officers
by the cashier. 23 5 The supreme court also stated that the inherent
value of a credit card is more than one hundred dollars. 23 6 Theft of
a credit card would thus constitute a felony. 23 7 The arrest was
therefore valid.
238
The court determined that because the arrest was valid, any
evidence coming from the arrest was admissible. 23 9 The court,
however, analyzed the next issue assuming an invalid 240 arrest:
whether the court erred in suppressing the witness' in court
identification of the defendant. 24
1
Evidence need not be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree if
it is attributed to an independent source. 242 When a witness had an








232. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15(4)(d) (Supp. 1981). Section 29-06-15(4) states that -[a]
peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person . . . [ojn a charge, made upon reasonable
cause, of the commission of a felony by the party arrested." Id.
233. 117 N.W.2d84(N.D. 1962).
234. State v. Willms, 117 N.W.2d 84,87 (N.D. 1962).
235. 315 N.W.2d at 676.
236. Id.
237. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-05 (Supp. 1981) (theft grading); id. S 12.1-23-02(3)
(possession of stolen property).
238. 315 N.W.2d at 676.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 677.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 678.
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defendant to the police a short time later, a court may believe that
the witness' in court identification of the defendant was not based
on a pretrial viewing of the defendant, but rather on an
independent source. 243 Here the cashier closely observed the
defendant during the commission of the crime. 244 She then gave the
police a fairly complete description of the defendant. 245 She later
identified the defendant's photograph from a group of six similar
photographs. 246 The court, therefore, concluded that any in court
identification of the defendant, even if there had been an invalid




In State v. Mondo248 the supreme court held that to support an
application for a search warrant a magistrate may consider a
contemporaneously filed affidavit that supports an application for
an arrest warrant. 249 The Mondo decision represents a clear
statement by the court that a magistrate is not bound to
information contained solely within the "four corners" of the
affidavit to determine the existence of probable cause. 250
In Mondo a police officer sought both an arrest warrant and a
search warrant based upon information received from the alleged
victim that she had been raped by the defendant and that she had
seen marijuana at the defendant's apartment.2 51 The officer's
affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant failed to
state the time or date of the alleged sexual offense. 252 This necessary
information was present, however, in a contemporaneously filed
affidavit in support of an arrest warrant. 253






248. 325 N.W.2d 201 (N.D. 1982).
249. State v. Mondo, 325 N.W.2d 201, 204 (N.D. 1982).
250. Id. The court briefly discussed the extent of the evolution in North Dakota of the "four
corners" issue by stating that its earlier decision in State v. Klosterman strongly implied that sworn
evidence apart from the affidavit may assist in establishing probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant. Id. See State v. Klosterman, 317 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1982). The court also noted that rule
41(c)(1) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly authorizes issuance of warrants
upon information from more than one affidavit. 325 N.W.2d at 204. See N.D.R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
251. 325 N.W.2d at 202.
252. Id. The court determined that the failure of the affidavit to state the time or date of the
alleged sexual offense rendered the affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause because
"probable cause to search depends upon whether or not evidence of criminal activity is presently
located at some particular place." Id. at 203.
253. Id. at 202-03.
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'substantial deference to judicial determinations of probable cause'
when the magistrate is 'neutral and detached.' ",254 The court
emphasized that a reviewing court's primary concern is that the
magistrate is sufficiently informed to make an independent
determination of probable cause.
255
The court held that the information contained in the separate
affidavit for the arrest warrant sufficiently informed the magistrate
of all facts necessary to issue a search warrant. 256 The magistrate
was thus able to make an independent determination that the police
officer would find evidence of the alleged sexual offense and




In State v. Puhr258 the supreme court held that evidence
obtained from the defendant's breathalyzer test was admissible
despite the fact that the test was not performed according to the
method approved by the state toxicologist. 25 9 The method approved
by the state toxicologist requires that the operator ascertain that the
subject has had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke within twenty
minutes prior to the collection of the breath sample.2 60 In Puhr the
defendant was under arrest for a maximum of eighteen minutes
before the test was administered. 261 The state toxicologist testified
at trial, however, that the test results were accurate if the subject
had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke within ten or twelve minutes. 262
Relying upon State v. Schneider, 263 the court reasoned that the
testimony of the state toxicologist at trial took precedence over the
"approved method.'' 264 The court concluded that the State
satisfied the foundational requirement of proving that the
breathalyzer test was "fairly administered" as required by
statute.2
65
254. Id. at 204.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. The defendant also argued that because the warrant for arrest did not specify the alleged
victim's name, the magistrate could not infer that the arrest warrant referred to the same sexual
offense as the affidavit for the search warrant. Id. at 204-05. The court rejected this argument stating
that a reviewing court should not make a "hypertechnical" examination of the information available
to the magistrate. Id. at 205.
258. 316 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1982).
259. State v. Puhr, 316 N.W.2d 75. 77-78 (N.D. 1982).
260. Id. at 76.
261. Id. at 76-77.
262. Id. at 77.
263. 270 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978).
264. 316 N.W.2d at 77.
265. Id. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 39-20-07 (1980) (breathalyzer tests admissible if "fairly
administered").
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State v. Schimetz
In State v. Schimetz266 the supreme court upheld Schimetz'
conviction for aggravated assault and denied the defendant's
motion for a new trial. 267 Testimony revealed that when Schimetz
returned to his unattended car he discovered Scott in the front
seat. 268 A struggle ensued, 269 and a short time after the scuffle Scott
realized that he had been stabbed. 270 The jury, relying on
circumstantial evidence, concluded that Schimetz was guilty of the
stabbing.271 The defendant contended that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault, that the
trial court erred in refusing to give certain jury instructions, and
that the court improperly admitted into evidence hearsay and lay
opinion testimony. 272
Concluding that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to
support the jury verdict, the supreme court stated that
"circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to find a person
guilty of the crime charged.' '273 The supreme court declared that
the trial court was correct in refusing the defendant's requested
jury instructions. 274 These instructions would have required for a
finding of an assault conviction that the defendant lacked an excuse
for the alleged conduct. 275 The court reasoned that there was no
evidence to support the requested jury instruction because the
defendant neither admitted stabbing Scott nor offered proof that
the use of force was necessary to prevent death, serious bodily
injury, or the commission of a felony. 276 Furthermore, the court
noted that the jury instructions did not need to mention the specific
culpability for the crime of aggravated assault; 277 the trial court's
instruction, which tracked the language of the aggravated assault
statute, 278 adequately advised the jury that aggravated assault
involves the willful causing of serious injury to another. 279
In determining that the trial court correctly decided that a
266. 328 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1982).
267. State v. Schimetz, 328 N.W.2d 808, 815 (N.D. 1982).
268. Id. at 810.
269. Id.
270. Id. Upon returning to a party, Scott was informed that he had received a stab wound. Id.
271. Id. at 811.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 814.
275. Id. at 812.
276. Id. at 812-13.
277. Id. at 814.
278. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-02(1) (1969) (a person is guilty of aggravated assault, a
class C felony, if he "[w]illfully causes serious bodily injury to another human being").
279. 328 N.W.2d at 814.
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police officer's testimony was not hearsay evidence, the court
observed that the confrontation clause 280 was satisfied because the
defendant could cross-examine the officer. 281 The court concluded
that the trial court properly admitted a lay witness' statement
concerning the seriousness of Scott's wound because the testimony
was not a legal or medical conclusion. 282 The court reasoned that
the challenged testimony discussed a matter upon which any
reasonable person could express his thoughts. 283
State v. Trieb
In State v. Trieb284 the supreme court held unconstitutional a
jury instruction that stated that it is presumed that an unlawful act
was done with unlawful intent. 28 5 Trieb was charged with murder
because he intentionally and knowingly caused the death of another
human being. 286 Trieb's chief defense was "lack of criminal
responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect at the time of
the alleged crime."
287
Relying on Sandstrom v. Montana288 and State v. Sheldon,289 the
court stated that the instruction deprived Trieb of his right to due
process of law. 290 The court reasoned that the jury may have
regarded the instruction as a mandatory presumption to find the
requisite intent once it was convinced that the defendant committed
the unlawful act. 29' Also, the jury may have viewed the
presumption as shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant. 292 The correct jury instructions on the presumption of
innocence and on the burden of proof did not foreclose the
280. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. ("In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ").
281. 328 N.W.2d at 815. The court noted that the testimony was not offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id.
282. Id. at 815.
283. Id.
284. 315 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1982).
285. State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 654 (N.D. 1982).
286. Id. at 651.
287. Id. The witnesses Trieb called stated that his youth was marked by turmoil, trauma, and
neglect. In addition, the use of alcohol and drugs had become a constant factor in Trieb's life. Id.
288. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). The United States Supreme Court held that the jury instruction, "the
law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," violates the
due process clause. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514 (1979).
289. 301 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002 (1981). Although the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that the presumption of intent contained in North Dakota Pattern Jury
Instruction 1313 was unconstitutional, the court reasoned that the presumption was harmless error
because Sheldon was convicted of reckless endangerment, an offense that does not require the
element of intent. State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 613 (N.D. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002
(1981).
290. 315 N.W.2d at 652.
291. Id.
292. Id. The jury was not told that the presumption could be rebutted. Id.
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possibility that the jury may have relied on the erroneous
presumption in reaching its verdict. 2
93
Trieb also asserted that the trial court erred in denying his
request to instruct the jury on the crime of manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of murder. 294 The court stated, however, that
there was not a sufficient evidentiary basis adduced at trial to
warrant a manslaughter conviction. 295
EDUCATION LAW
Loney v. Grass Lake Public School District
In Loney v. Grass Lake Public School District296 Loney appealed
from an order of the district court that dissolved a temporary
injunction against the Grass Lake Public School District and
ordered Loney to accept or reject the teacher contract offered to her
by the school district. 297 The appellant argued that even though she
was the only certified teacher-employee within the school district,
she had the right to negotiate with the school district under the
provisions of chapter 15-38.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 2
98
The supreme court rejected the district court's interpretation
of section 15-38.1-02(3)299 and held that a teacher who is employed
as the only certified teacher-employee of a school district constitutes
an appropriate negotiating unit and is entitled to negotiate with the
school board of the school district. 300 The court discerned that the
purpose of the chapter is to promote improvement of personnel
management and relations between school boards and their
certified employees. 30' The court found an implied intent by the
293. Id. at 653. The court stated that the mere possibility that thejury reached its verdict in an
impermissible manner is sufficient to require reversal. Id. at 656.
294. Id. at 656.
295. Id. at 657. The court stated that two questions must be answered in deciding whether a
defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense: "First, does the instruction
include an offense which is a lesser included offense to the offense charged? Second, does the evidence
in the case create a reasonable doubt as to the greater offense and support beyond a reasonable doubt
a conviction of the lesser included offense?" Id. at 656.
296. 322 N.W.2d 470 (N.D. 1982).
297. Loney v. Grass Lake Pub. School Dist., 322 N.W.2d 470, 470 (N.D. 1982). The district
court order, dated June 23, 1982, ordered the appellant either to accept or reject the proposed
teacher contract by noon, July 8, 1982. Id.
298. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 15-38.1 (1981) (negotiations between teachers and school
boards).
299. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 15-38.1-02(3) (1981). The statute defines an appropriate
negotiating unit as "a group of teachers having common interests, common problems, a common
employer, or a history of common representation, which warrants that group being represented by a
single representative organization in negotiations with a school board." Id.
300. 322 N.W.2d at 472.
301. Id. at 473. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 15-38.1-01 (1981) (purpose of Act is to provide public
school certified employees with the right to be represented by professional organizations).
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legislature to allow all certified teachers an opportunity for
negotiations, including certified teachers in single teacher school
districts. 30 2 The court stated that Loney may negotiate through a
chosen representative organization as provided under- the
chapter30 3 or may negotiate under self-representation as long as the
school district is not wrongfully misled.
30 4
Quarles v. McKenzie Public School District
In Quarles v. McKenzie Public School District30 5 the plaintiff
brought an action against the school board for wrongful
nonrenewal of her teaching contract. 30 6  The school board
restructured the school system and made a lower contract offer to
the plaintiff. 30 7 When the plaintiff questioned the propriety of the
proposed decrease in salary, the school board decided not to renew
the plaintiffs contract.
3 08
The question presented to the court was whether the reduced
salary offered in the contract constituted a failure to renew the
contract. 30 9 The supreme court held that a severe reduction in
salary requires the school board to follow the nonrenewal
procedures provided in section 15-47-27 of the North Dakota





In Briese v. Briese312 the husband appealed from a district court
judgment dividing property and awarding alimony in a divorce
action. 313 The parties were divorced after thirty-one years of
302. 322 N.W.2d at 472-73.
303. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 15-38.1-01 (1981).
304. 322 N.W.2d at 473.
305. 325 N.W.2d 662 (N.D. 1982).
306. Quarles v. McKenzie Pub. School Dist., 325 N.W.2d 662, 663 (N.D. 1982).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 663-64.
309. Id. at 664.
310. Id. at 667. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-27 (1981) (teacher has a right to a hearing about
nonrenewal).
311. 325 N.W.2d at 664. The court followed an earlier decision that interpreted 5 15-47-27 of
the North Dakota Century Code. Id. (citing Enstad v. North Central of Barnes Pub. School Dist.,
268 N.W.2d 126 (N.D. 1978) (teacher has no further reemployment rights after rejecting a
reasonable offer of reemployment)). The court also considered § 15-47-38 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 325 N.W.2d at 670. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-38 (1981) (requirements for the
reasons for nonrenewal).
312. 325 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1982).
313. Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245, 246 (N.D. 1982).
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marriage and had nine children. 314 The district court awarded the
wife one-half of the property and five hundred dollars in alimony
per month until the husband retired and one-third of his retirement
benefits thereafter. 315 The husband appealed on the grounds that
he was entitled to a greater portion of the divided property because
most of it was acquired through his skill and labor.316 The husband
also contended that the property division was inequitable because it
could cause him to bear a disproportionate share of the income tax
burden if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should treat him as
sole owner of the property for income tax purposes. 317 He also
objected to the award of alimony on the ground that it served no
rehabilitative purpose. 3
1 8
The supreme court held that considering the wife's age, her
level of education, her physical condition, and her service as a
homemaker in raising nine children during the thirty-one years of
marriage, it could not set aside the trial court's division of property
as being clearly erroneous.31 9 The supreme court stated that the
wife's contribution to the home as wife and mother was not an
insignificant contribution to the marriage. 320 The court concluded
that section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code empowers
the trial court to make such an equitable distribution of the
property as may seem just and proper. 321
The supreme court rejected the husband's contention that he
would bear a disproportionate share of the income tax burden. 322
The court stressed that the parties stipulated that the trial court's
order concerning equal apportionment of capital gains would
include all federal income tax consequences. 323 The court refused to
modify the trial court's division of property in the event that the
IRS treated the husband as sole owner of marital property for
income tax purposes, rather than as joint owner with the wife. 324
The court stated that the husband was in effect asking the court to
modify the division of property on the basis of a tax contingency




316. Id. at 247.
317. Id. at 247-48.
318. Id. at 249.
319. Id. at 247. See Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 757 (N.D. 1981) (guidelines for a
trial court in determining an equitable distribution of property in a divorce action).
320. 325 N.W.2d at 247.
321. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971) (permanent alimony and division of property).






The court found that the alimony award was also within the
discretion of the trial court, 326 which had considered the wife's age,
health, education, and work experience.3 27 The husband argued
that the alimony award was erroneous because it served no
rehabilitative purpose. 328 The court rejected this argument because
it could reasonably conclude from the trial court record that




In Jacobson v. Jacobson330 the supreme court held that a district
court's award of child custody to a homosexual mother in a divorce
action was clearly erroneous. 331 The district court determined that
both parents were "fit, willing and able to assume the custodial
role, "332 but concluded that maintaining the children in the
mother's custody would serve the best interests of the children.
333
Under the circumstances of this case, 334 the supreme court said that
because of the mother's homosexual living arrangement and the
mores of society, giving the father custody would best serve the
interests of the children.
335
Mansukhani v. Failing
In Mansukhani v. Pailing36 Jenny (Pailing) Mansukhani sought
custody of her children by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, the district court awarded Jenny custody, and the
grandparents appealed. 337 The supreme court reversed, awarding
custody of the children to the grandparents. 338
James and Jenny Pailing were married in 1974. 339 Two
children were born of the marriage.3 40 In January of 1976 James
326. Id. at 249. The supreme court noted in Williams v. Williams it distinguished the concepts of
equitable property division and alimony on the ground that the concepts have different purposes. Id.
(noting Williams v. Williams. 302 N.W.2d 754.758 (N.D. 1981)).
327. 325 N.W.2d at 249.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1982).
331.Jacobson v.Jacobson. 314 N.W.2d 78.80 (N.D. 1982).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 79.
334. Id. at 80.
335. Id. at82.
336. 318 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1982).
337. Mansukhani v. Pailing. 318 N.W.2d 748. 749 (N.D. 1982).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 749.
340. Id.
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and Jenny separated, and Jenny returned with the children to her
parents' home in Drake, North Dakota. 341 In December of 1976
Jenny asked her mother to take the children to their father. At that
time James Pailing was living in Butte with his parents, Donald
and Jean Pailing. 342 In 1977 James andjenny lived together in
Minot for about six weeks; the children remained in Butte with
Donald and Jean Pailing.3 43 James and Jenny were divorced on
October 6, 1977, and James was awarded custody of the
children. 344 During this time the children continued to live with
their grandparents as they had since December of 1976. 345 In 1980
James Pailing was killed, and Jenny sought custody of her
children.346
In reversing the district court's award, the supreme court first
set forth the test to be used in determining custody in a divorce
action. 347 The proper test is the best interests of the child. 348 The
supreme court stated that the district court's reliance on the fitness
of the mother was improper and erroneous 
349
The court restated the test for determining whether custody
should be awarded to the grandparents or to the natural parents. 35
0
The supreme court in Hust v. Hust35 stated that an award of
custody to the grandparents instead of a natural parent is clearly
erroneous unless exceptional circumstances exist that require such
a disposition in the best interests of the child.
352
The supreme court said that the district court had arbitrarily
disregarded expert testimony indicating that it would be
detrimental to the children to place them in the custody of their
mother. 35 3 One psychologist testified that the children considered
their grandparents as their psychological parents and that it would
be difficult for them to adjust to living with their mother.
354






346. Id. After her husband's death, Jenny Pailing sought custody and asked the grandparents to
give her the children. When they refused, she filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district
court gavejenny custody, and the grandparents appealed. The supreme court remanded the case for
an evidentiary hearing on the issue of custody. Id. at 750. See Mansukhani v. Pailing, 300 N.W.2d
847 (N.D. 1980). The district court again awarded the mother custody. 318 N.W.2d at 750. This
case is a result of the grandparents' second appeal. Id.




351. 295 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1980).
352. Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 319 (N.D. 1980).




conceptualize was that of their grandparents. 355 The expert
testimony showed a strong psychological parent relationship
between the children and their grandparents and a lack of a
personal relationship between the children and their mother.
356
The court also stressed the importance of continuity and stability in
the children's lives. 
357
The expert testimony and the children's need for continuity
and stability constituted exceptional circumstances; 358 the district




In Mortenson v. TangedahP60 Terry Baustad, the noncustodial
parent, appealed from a final decree of adoption. 361 The decree of
adoption terminated Baustad's parental rights and approved the
adoption of his children by Wesley Mortenson. 362 Baustad did not
consent to the adoption. 363 The petition for adoption alleged that
the natural father had not consented to the adoption, but that his
consent was unnecessary because it was excused under section 14-
15-06(1)(b) of the North Dakota Century Code. 364
On appeal, Baustad contended that the adoptive father did not
meet his statutory burden of proving that Baustad failed
significantly and without justifiable cause to communicate with his
children for a period of one year. 365 Baustad contended that as a
result of Mortenson's failure of proof, the district court erred in
holding that Baustad's consent was not required. 366 The supreme
court affirmed the final decree of adoption, holding that the facts
supported the trial court's finding.
367
355. Id.
356. Id. at 753.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 755.
360. 317 N.W.2d 107 (N.D. 1982).
361. Mortenson v. Tangedahl, 317 N.W.2d 107, 108 (N.D. 1982).
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-06(1)(b) (1981). Section 14-15-06(1)(b) provides:
Consent to adoption is not required of... [a] parent of a child in the custody of
another, if the parent for a period of at least one year has failed significantly without
justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and
support of the child as required by law orjudicial decree.
Id.
365. 317 N.W.2d at 108.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 115.
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In determining that the facts sustained the trial court's
decision, the court examined the two major factors considered by
the trial court. 368 Baustad saw his children only twice in the twelve
months preceding the filing of the petition. 369 Both contacts were
initiated by the children. 370 Baustad did not contend that the
court's findings were erroneous, but that its conclusion was not
supported by the evidence. 371  Baustad argued that his
communications obviated the statute and that as a result his
consent was necessary for the adoptions. 372 The court interpreted
the word significantly to mean important or momentous and
concluded that Baustad's communications had been neither. 373 The
court reasoned that because Baustad failed significantly to
communicate with his children, his consent to the adoption was not
required.
374
Pritchett v. Social Service Board
In Pritchett v. Social Service Board3 75 the supreme court had its
first opportunity to determine the proper scope of review to apply to
a termination of parental rights action under the Revised Uniform
Adoption Act. 376 The court held that the review should be in the
form of a de novo proceeding3 77 in the same manner as under the
Uniform Juvenile Court Act. 378 The court then found that the
natural father had abandoned his child and that the trial court
correctly terminated his parental rights.379
In a special concurrence, Justice Pederson noted that rule
52(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 380 applies "in
all actions tried upon the facts without a jury," and therefore, he
could find no law or theory to support a trial de novo. 381





373. Id. at 113. The court distinguished cases with similar statutes that lacked the word sig-
nificantly. Id. at 114.
374. Id. at 115.
375. 325 N.W.2d 217 (N.D. 1982).
376. Pritchett v. Social Serv. Bd., 325 N.W.2d 217, 219-20 (N.D. 1982). See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-15-19(3)(a) (1981) (Revised Uniform Adoption Act: relinquishment and termination of parental
rights).
377. 325 N.W.2d at 220. See In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 211 (N.D. 1979) (clearly erroneous
rule does not apply).
378. 325 N.W.2d at 220. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(1)(a) (1981) (Uniform Juvenile
Court Act: termination of parental rights).
379. 325 N.W.2d at 222.
380. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (clearly erroneous standard applies "in all actions tried upon the
facts without ajury").




In Aberle v. Karn382 third-party defendants, Commercial
Insurance Company and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company, sought declaratory relief to determine liability
coverage. 383 The underlying action arose out of the alleged
negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the insured's
employee. 384 The St. Paul policy specifically excluded that
particular employee from coverage. 38 5 The insured denied liability,
cross-claimed against the employee, and brought into the case as
third-party defendants the insurance companies, each of whom had
denied coverage to the insured and refused to defend. 386 The
insurance companies sought a declaratory judgment to determine
which, if either, company had coverage and a duty to defend. 38 7
The district court held that St. Paul Fire and Marine was
liable for coverage and that the exclusion contained in its policy was
void as against public policy. 388 The supreme court reversed and
remanded in a three-to-two decision. 389
The supreme court considered two issues: whether the grant of
declaratory relief was proper under the circumstances of the case
390
and whether the insurer's specific exclusion of an individual under
a policy violates public policy. 391 With respect to the first issue, the
court held that the insurer was in a better position to determine if it
should defend, based upon its investigation of the facts and
research of applicable law, than was the court, which must make "a
speculative determination based upon minimum facts." ' 392 The
court also suggested that to properly grant declaratory relief "there
must be a showing of how the declaration aids in the disposition of
the basic controversy." 393 Because the district court's relief did not
aid in the disposition of the underlying negligence claim, that relief
was unwarranted. 394 The court recognized that its decision placed a
burden on the insurance companies because an insurer's decision
382. 316 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1982).
383. Aberle v. Karn, 316 N.W.2d 779, 781 (N.D. 1982).
384. Id. at 780.
385. Id. at 784.
386. Id. at 781.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 784.
389. Id. at 783-84.
390. Id. at 782.
391. Id. at 784.
392. Id. at 783.
393. Id. at 782.
394. Id.
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not to defend entails "the risk that that action may be claimed later
to be bad faith, permitting a tort claim" by the insured.
395
The supreme court also reversed the district court's decision
regarding the specific exclusion contained in the St. Paul policy. 396
This reversal followed from the reversal of the district court's grant
of declaratory relief. 397 The majority opinion implied that such an
exclusion might be void as against public policy, 398 but the court





In Bergstrom v. Bergstrom400 the supreme court considered
whether a parent's remarriage and move to a foreign country
created changed circumstances under which a child's best interests
dictated that a previous custody order be modified to allow the
parent to remove the child from the United States.4 0
1 The supreme
court ruled that the trial court's denial of the modification motion
was not "clearly erroneous.' '402
In a previous decision 40 3 the supreme court awarded the
parents joint custody of the child conditioned, in part, on the
mother's maintaining a United States residence for the child.
40 4 In
a subsequent modification hearing following a remand of the case
to the district court, the district court granted permanent custody to
the father during the school year and to the mother during the
summer. 40 5 The district court also denied the mother's request to
take her daughter outside the United States for purposes of
visitation.
40 6
The mother appealed the modified order, claiming that her
recent remarriage and move to a foreign country created changed
circumstances dictating that it would be in her child's best interest
395. Id. at 783.
396. Id. at 784.
397. Id.
398. Id. The court stated that "there may be some basis in § 26-41-04, NDCC, to support a
conclusion that public policy should void the ... exclusion here." Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-
04 (1978) (indicates security requirements for owners and operators of motor vehicles in North
Dakota).
399. 316 N.W.2d at 784.
400. 320 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1982).
401. Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 320 N.W.2d 119,123 (N.D. 1982).
402. Id.
403. Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d 490 (N.D. 1980).





to allow the child to visit outside the United States. 40 7 She also
contended that the restriction on her award of custody deprived her
of her parental rights. 40 8 Finally, she asserted that the trial court
was not required by the supreme court's earlier decision to restrict
the child's overseas visitation.
40 9
The supreme court agreed that the trial court read the
supreme court's earlier decision too broadly, 410 but found that the
trial court's custody determination was nevertheless based on the
child's best interest and therefore was not "clearly erroneous.' '411
The court noted further that while a parent has a fundamental right
to his or her child, this right is not absolute, but is subordinated in a
custody dispute to what is best for the child. 41
2
PROPERTY
McLain v. Midway Township
In McLain v. Midway Township413 the McLains brought an
action against Midway Township, claiming damages for the
township's refusal to grant them permission to move a house into
the township. 41 4 A township zoning ordinance required all property
owners within a one-half mile radius of the proposed site to sign a
petition consenting to the moving of a building or house into the
township. 41 5 The McLains attempted to comply with the ordin-
ance, but did not obtain the required signatures. 41 6 The McLains
asserted that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and that
the township board acted unlawfully in refusing to permit them to
move their house. 41 7 The district court awarded damages to the
McLains.
418
On appeal the supreme court held that despite the conceded
unconstitutionality of the zoning ordinance, 4 9 Midway Township




411. Id. at 123-24.
412. Id. at 123.
413. 326 N.W.2d 196 (N.D. 1982).
414. McLain v. Midway Township, 326 N.W.2d 196, 198 (N.D. 1982).
415. Id. at 197. The township zoning administrator told the McLains to rezone the property on
which they wished to place their house. Id. He also asked them to submit a formal plat. Id.
416. Id. The McLains believed they had obtained all the necessary signatures on the first
petition, but the township board of supervisors advised them that they needed additional signatures.
Id. The McLains circulated a second petition, but this petition failed to state that the McLains
intended to move a house onto the property. Id. The McLains circulated a third petition, but they
did not obtain all the required signatures. Id.
417. Id. at 198.
418. Id. at 196.
419. Id. at 199.
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was statutorily immune from liability for damages based on the
property owners' decision to deny permission. 420 The court noted
that section 32-12.1-03(3) of the North Dakota Century Code421
specifically provides for township immunity.
4 22
420. Id.
421. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(3) (Supp. 1981)(liability of political subdivisions).
422. 326 N.W.2d at 198.
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